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ABSTRACT 
In April and June 2014, Afghanistan conducted its first democratic transition of power. This commentary 
provides a first-hand account and appraisal of the conduct of the elections, and begins by capturing first 
the atmospherics of polling day, and then reviews some lasting impressions of the same. After identifying 
some of the common themes and strands that characterised the polling including, polling procedures, 
individual and/or team performances of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and the security 
measures put in place, etc. the commentary concludes by advocating for the continued improvement 
(best practices) of the electoral enterprise. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On April 5, and June 14, 2014, I served as an 
international election observer
Commission (IEC) and observed polling 
conducted in Kabul. On both occasions I 
partnered and observed with teams of 
international observers comprising of scholars 
writing on Afghanistan. On April 5, my four-
member team (travelling in a convoy of two 
vehicles) visited a total of ten polling centres in 
Kabul at which votes were being cast or counted 
for the presidential and provincial council 
elections. In addition to observing and 
documenting polling procedures, the team was 
keen on capturing the atmospherics of polling 
day. Smaller teams were organised for the June 
run-off in order to a) minimise potential security 
risks (larger convoys attract unwanted attention), 
and b) survey/observe polling at more districts 
and neighbourhoods. Thus on June 14 my two-
member team, visited a total of thirteen polling 
centres in Kabul at which votes were being cast 
or counted for the presidential run-off election. 
This time my team was keen to contrast the 
atmospherics with the elections of April 5. The 
following notes briefly reflect my experiences 
the 2014 
Presidential elections mark the first ever  
democratic transfer of power 
history national elections. 
It is important to indicate that this commentary 
does not assess the implications of the recently 
concluded unity government deal (power-
sharing) or the political process, per se. Instead, 
the commentary provides a first-hand account 
and appraisal of the conduct of the elections. The 
paper begins by capturing first the atmospherics 
of polling day, and then reviews some lasting 
impressions of the same. After identifying some 
of the common themes and strands that 
characterise the polling including, polling 
procedures, individual and/or team performances 
of election officials, logistical shortcomings, and 
the security measures put in place, etc. the 
commentary concludes by advocating for the 
continued improvement (best practices) of the 
electoral enterprise.      
  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFGHAN ELECTIONS IN 
THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
election was held on 9 October 2004, followed by 
parliamentary elections on 18 September 2005. 
The IEC estimated that about 70% of 
registered voters (approximately 8 million) cast 
their ballots. Hamid Karzai won the presidency 
with 55.4% of the vote (Independent Election 
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Commission, 2004). In the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, voter turnout dropped by 20% to 50% 
(approximately 6.4 million voters), and warlords 
and women gained more seats in the lower 
house and provincial councils than had been 
anticipated. Both the presidential and 
parliamentary races were marred by allegations 
of political manoeuvring potential candidates 
dropping out of the race in return for promises of 
political office and irregularities (including 
several cases of voter over-registration which 
indicates fraud). 
The 2009 presidential election witnessed a 
significant drop in voter turnout: 38.7% in 2009 
as opposed to 70% in 2004. The incumbent Hamid 
Karzai won 49.7% of the vote, indicating 
substantial support across ethnic and tribal lines 
(Independent Election Commission, 2009). Fraud 
was once again a concern, and in much greater 
scale than in 2004/2005; irregularities including 
ballot stuffing and intimidation of voters were 
widely reported by several candidates, their 
campaigns, and the media. The elections were 
also marred by insurgent violence targeted 
against ordinary citizens, elections officials, and 
security personnel. The multi-national 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
recorded 400 incidents on election day. 
The 2014 presidential election was the third 
presidential poll since the fall of the Taliban, and 
was contested by eleven candidates (three of 
whom had withdrawn from the race prior to the 
April election). The incumbent Hamid Karzai was 
constitutionally barred from contesting the 
elections. Opinion polls showed Dr. Ashraf Ghani 
and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as front-runners. A 
former academic and World Bank employee, 
Gh
Minister between 2002-2004. An ethnic Pashtun, 
Ghani selected the Uzbek strongman General 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, and the Hazara politician 
Sarwar Danish, as his first and second vice-
presidential running-mates. During the lead up 
to election day, observers and analysts 
speculated that Ghani would receive a majority 
challenger was Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who was 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2001-2005. 
Abdullah forged a name in politics as a senior 
member of the Northern Alliance and worked as 
an advisor to the late anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban 
leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Abdullah selected 
the Pashtun politician Mohammad Khan and the 
Hazara strongman and politician Mohammad 
Mohaqiq as his first and second vice-presidential 
running-mates. Abdullah was expected to 
command the majority of the Tajik and Hazara 
votes. Both Ghani and Abdullah had registered 
for the 2009 presidential campaign with the 
former securing only 3% of the total vote while 
Abdullah was runner-up to incumbent Hamid 
Karzai and secured 30.6% of the total vote. 
Alongside the first presidential ballot, some 
2,713 candidates, including more than 300 
women, registered as provincial council 
candidates. The provincial council candidates 
campaigned for 458 seats, which are distributed 
population-based formula. Ninety six seats (20%) 
country-wide are reserved for women. Once 
elected, the council members will serve for a 
four-year term.   
 
OBSERVING POLLING IN KABUL CITY 
On both occasions, due to security constraints, 
my teams were forced to remain in Kabul city 
and observe different centres in its various 
neighbourhoods. The routes we selected to carry 
out our observations comprised of a number of 
neighbourhoods and districts with diverse ethnic 
populations: Khair Khana with a predominantly 
Tajik population; Qala-e Fatullah, with a mixed 
Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara population; Kart-e 
Now with a predominantly Pashtun population; 
Kart-e Parwan, with a mixed Pashtun, Tajik, and 
Sikh population; Kart-e Sakhi, with a 
predominantly Hazara population (and smaller 
numbers of Tajiks and Pashtuns); Dar ul Aman; 
Bagh-e Qazi, with a predominantly Hazara 
population; Dasht-e Barchi, with a 
predominantly Hazara population; 6 Darak, with 
a mixed population; Makroyan, with a mixed 
population; Wazir Akbar Khan, with a mixed 
population; and finally, Taimani, with a mixed 
population.  
I note that accurate ethnic and minority 
statistics are not available for Kabul, or indeed 
much of Afghanistan, due to the lack of census 
data. The breakdown provided above is based on 
the observations of several Kabul-based Afghan 
researchers (including members of 
premier elections watchdog, the Free and Fair 
Elections Forum), I had occasion to converse 
with. Furthermore, the demography of Kabul is 
changing rapidly: in 2003, a University of 
Nebraska study funded by the National 
Geographic Society reported that Tajiks 
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comprised 45 hile 
Pashtuns comprised only 25% (National 
Geographic Society, 2003). While not disputing 
-based researchers 
mention that the percentage of Pashtuns has 
significantly increased during the twelve years 
since. 
The breakdown notwithstanding, it must be 
noted that Kabul is a sprawling, urban city and in 
some areas families of different ethnic affiliation 
reside in close proximity to each other, tied 
together by the ethos and demands of capital life. 
be characterised as monolithic, determined by 
bloc or group affiliation; instead, it is dynamic, 
with group or bloc identification being replaced 
by more personalised interests and views (the 
role of the media is critical here). This helps 
Kabul stand apart from not just its rural 
counterparts, but other urban centres in 
geographic regions where ethnic compositions 
are less heterogeneous.  
 
THE ELECTIONS ATMOSPHERE:           
ANXIETY AND HOPE 
This section draws attention to the general 
atmosphere immediately prior to the April 5 
election, and in the interim period between the 
two rounds of elections. The section paints a 
picture of both the anxieties and hopes of 
individuals and communities, their aspirations 
waiting to be realised via the ballot paper. 
 
Between optimism and pessimism 
During the lead up to the April 5 election, both 
foreign and Afghan observers media persons, 
analysts, civil society advocates, etc. sensed a 
change was in the offing. The political and social 
atmosphere in Afghanistan was palpable, 
exuding much promise. The youth in particular, 
many of who are actively involved in 
government and other institutions and agencies, 
were hopeful of reforms that a change in 
government could entail; regardless of which 
presidential candidate youths supported, they 
were united in their desire for change. Optimism 
amon  
Sensing the popular demand for a change in 
government, and the corollaries such a transition 
affects, the campaigns reached out to the masses. 
As one expert has noted, campaigns in 
ort, reach 
out to new constituencies and project an image 
of success. This is done through large gatherings, 
(Bijlert, 2009: 11). Thus, both candidates staged 
rallies to attract votes.  The large turnout at these 
rallies is evidence of that desire for change. While 
it is difficult to predict future turnout numbers, 
supporters had been turning up for days in 
campaign rally in Panjsher, for example, brought 
nearly 50,000 supporters a record figure for the 
city (Bose, 2014). While campaigns themselves 
were somewhat responsible for mobilising 
supporters (the youth in particular), the majority 
of Afghans showed genuine interest and 
enthusiasm for electoral competition. 
The June 14 run-off election on the other hand 
populace several persons I interviewed were 
more sceptical of a positive outcome. The chief 
source of scepticism was the question of 
legitimacy: people felt a win for either Dr 
Abdullah or Dr. Ghani would be less legitimate 
populations may not accept the electoral 
outcome. In such event, the government of 
Afghanistan would lack a unanimous mandate to 
govern, further eroding the writ of the state. And 
so in June the enthusiasm of the April poll was 
replaced by apathy; Kabul witnessed a lower 
voter turn-out.  
What explains the lower turn-out in Kabul? 
First, voting in non-urban centres is much more 
structured and parties/candidates are able to 
mobilise votes better. In contrast, voting in urban 
centres tend to be more personalised. This is best 
exemplified by Kabuli youth who, somewhat 
surprisingly, did not vote in large numbers as 
expected. My discussions with youths indicated 
that they felt the outcome had been 
predetermined (deals brokered) and/or their 
solitary vote would not help determine the 
outcome anyway. The panacea for apathy is to 
There is the perception among the populace that 
elite backroom dealings undermine both the 
democratic process and voter demands and 
aspirations. Regardless of the identity of the 
losing candidate, voters need to perceive that 
their votes count and their candidates are elected 
through the designated democratic process. 
Nevertheless, the mass mobilisation of citizens 
resilience and indicates the progress of the 
democratic project in the country; despite the 
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security risks and threats, the large numbers 
present at mass rallies and polling places was 
 
 
The insurgent threat 
Prior to the elections, the international 
community were bracing themselves for a 
Taliban onslaught aimed at derailing the holding 
of elections. The militant group has been issuing 
statements for months, saying the April 5 vote for 
a successor to President Hamid Karzai is a 
western-backed sham election and they will stop 
at nothing to disrupt it by attacking election 
workers and infrastructure. They had even 
warned civilians that heading to polling stations 
on election day would be deadly. The insurgent 
threat made polling in scores of districts 
untenable, with nearly 1000 sites closed (threats 
and attacks prior to the June 14 poll saw 
approximately 200 more polling centres close). 
The Taliban came good on their threats when 
they attacked the IEC headquarters in Kabul a 
mere week prior to the April 5 election (Carberry, 
2014). Most of the violence on April 5, however, 
was minimal and concentrated in the eastern 
provinces that resulted in 20 casualties (Coren et 
al., 2014). In an attempt to explain the relative 
calm of polling day, The Kabul Times reported on 
2 April 2014 that some analysts suspected 
discord within the Taliban ranks. A more 
plausible explanation, however, is that just as 
with the rest of the world, the Taliban, too, may 
have concluded the inevitability of a run-off and 
saved their worst for later. June 14 witnessed 150 
attacks that resulted in 68 casualties (39 civilians 
and 29 security officials) (Trofimov et al., 2014). 
While some of the attacks were relatively minor 
(for example, the rocket attacks launched at 
Kabul airport but failed to hit the intended 
targets) others more heinous and grotesque BBC 
News reports from Herat on 15 June 2014 (BBC, 
2014) confirm a sordid story that the Taliban cut 
off the ink-stained forefingers of 11 persons who 
had voted recently, in a desperate attempt to 
dissuade voters from going to the polls.  
 
Ethnic considerations and anxieties 
In the first round, Dr Ghani experienced a 
heavy defeat. Many analysts and observers have 
explained the defeat by highlighting: a) the 
fractious nature of the Pashtun vote the Pashtun 
vote was divided among several Pashtun 
candidates running for office. The three other 
major Pashtun candidates were Zalmay Rasoul, 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Quayum Karzai. And b) 
-mate) 
failure to receive a larger portion of the Uzbek 
vote. Dr Ghani did not fare well in three 
provinces with significant Uzbek populations; he 
failed to garner 40% of the vote in Sar-e-Pul 
(39%), Samangan (27%), and Kunduz (38%) (Bose, 
2014). Instead, Dr Abdullah won a plurality in all 
three provinces, helping propel him to a first-
place finish countrywide. Following the defeat, 
Dr Ghani stepped up his campaign strategy, 
approaching the mullahs for their endorsement 
(which he got). He also addressed some 
campaign shortcomings: a) General Dostum 
barely campaigned outside of his stronghold area 
of Sheberghan, and Dr Ghani took it upon himself 
to bear the burdens of a gruelling campaign by 
calling on Pashtun communities to unite behind 
him. Towards achieving such, he also b) 
approached tribal elders in an attempt to secure 
Paktia, Logar, Paktika, Ghazni, etc. (Ruttig and 
Ibrahimi, 2014). 
While members from the Ghani camp and a 
handful of analysts (see Clark, 2014) have 
claimed that rural women in these provinces did 
turn out in larger-than-expected numbers, 
estimates should be viewed critically. Given that 
the run-off election secured a higher %age (38% in 
June as compared to 33% in April) of female 
votes, it may appear that Dr Ghani was successful 
provinces. Should women have indeed turned 
out in larger numbers it would signal a 
social conditions for which simply are non-
existent
eastern provinces appears untenable: in 2004 
and 2009, women in these provinces barely 
voted. In the April 2014 poll, women from these 
provinces barely accounted for the 
It is doubtful that the rigid cultural norms would 
be amenable to dilution/reform (even if 
pragmatic) following a few weeks of 
campaigning and/or deal making. 
Meanwhile, Dr Abdullah undermined the 
significant lead he held from the first round of 
elections by focusing the post-April 5 campaign 
strategy on pandering to the Northern 
communities still recall the years of mujahideen 
rule, one rife with inter-ethnic strife. Pashtuns 
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Abdullah the first time, for instance, would be 
troubled with the pro-mujahideen rhetoric. Even 
some Tajik youth and officials I interviewed 
expressed similar concerns; they felt Dr Abdullah 
would do himself no favours and should have 
invested his time between the two elections 
wooing the fence sitters and Pashtuns. 
 
Role of media 
Ensuring the credibility, inclusivity, and 
transparency of elections is critical to the future 
stability of Afghanistan. Here, the Afghan media 
(including social-media) played a critical role in 
first democratic transition of power, Afghan 
journalists and media persons rose to the task of 
fulfilling their roles in a professional and 
responsible manner, particularly in high risk, 
politically unstable provinces.  
First and foremost, the wide coverage of the 
election process during the months preceding the 
elections played an important role in bringing 
awareness to citizens and encouraging them to 
participate in the elections. Political campaigns, 
too, recognised the potential of media exposure. 
In the 2009 elections, television stations were 
unable to get the two leading presidential 
candidates to have a public debate. Then, prior to 
the April 2014 elections, there were three 
televised debates featuring the top candidates, 
and more than 12 million people according to 
TOLO NEWS, which broadcast the debates, 
watched them. 
In urban areas, the media helped mobilise 
individuals and communities by encouraging 
them to a) attend campaign rallies and speeches, 
b) discuss the value and importance of the 
democratic process and transition, and c) vote on 
election day. Without media coverage and 
influence the Presidential candidates would not 
have been able to draw large crowds at rallies 
and speeches a necessary strategy that boasts 
(and exaggerates) their popularity and 
legitimacy. In a country where fraud is 
ubiquitous, the candidates need to demonstrate 
to their domestic constituencies and 
international backers that they can engender the 
votes necessary to govern. In addition, extensive 
media coverage of the campaigns helped voters 
form direct personal impressions of candidates 
and erode block voting substantiated by how Dr 
Abdullah managed to generate 20% of the vote in 
Kandahar province. 
In remote and provincial areas of Afghanistan 
citizens to speak their minds, and women and 
ndance is taboo. It is in these 
impoverished regions that local media provide 
the safest alternative public space for political 
engagement. Media provides a virtual town hall 
where all citizens can engage, debate, listen, and 
share information, aspirations and concerns. In 
the aftermath of the elections, several leading 
Afghan media campaign personalities 
acknowledged the positive impact of citizen 
and Twitter users helped us reach areas that our 
observers c
way to create a direct relationship with each 
statement, Ahmad Shuja, a representative of the 
citizen journalist programme, Paiwandgah, said, 
TOLO News, 
2014). 
 Despite these positive contributions, however, 
the media were not impartial to the elections 
process. On the elections days, media 
organisations and unions undertook to avoid 
reporting negative news that could undermine 
the elections process. Danish Karokhel, the head 
of a leading Afghan news agency, Pajhwok 
Agency News, mentions how the desire among 
some reporters for a high turnout was so strong, 
particularly in dangerous areas of the country 
where participation was very low in the 2009 
vote, that they said they deliberately held back 
on reporting about violence that might dissuade 
potential voters (Ahmed and Zahori, 2014). The 
sentiments behind such actions reveal a sense of 
deep responsibility to facilitate the elections; a 
recognition that the media could have an 
influence on events; a remarkable development 
in a country with little history of press freedom. 
  
WORKING TOWARDS REALISING AN 
EFFICIENT AND LEGITIMATE ELECTION 
The elections enterprise tells a story: a story of 
both institutional triumph and shortcoming. This 
section describes the measures taken to ensure 
the efficient and legitimate transfer of power 
including, some of the critical logistical 
discrepancies that seized much of the public and 
international debate, the technical characteristics 
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of the elections process and lessons learned for 
the future therein, and finally, the security efforts 
and measures implemented to deny spoilers the 
opportunity to derail the electoral process. 
 
Logistics 
Both rounds of elections witnessed severe 
shortages in presidential ballot papers. The 
shortages should have been anticipated. During 
the first round of elections, and attempting to 
mitigate the prospects of fraud and irregularities, 
Afghan institutions issued only 600 ballot papers 
for every polling station. Yet, this is only a partial 
explanation for the shortage. Rather, and more 
significantly, both (former) President Karzai and 
the European Union should shoulder much of the 
blame: neither has been inclined politically to 
implement a voter-registration process that 
would help determine exact numbers of voters 
by district. The process would have ensured that 
the correct numbers of ballot papers were issued. 
The process need not be laborious and/or 
expensive: in fact, all the necessary information 
for the registry process is available on 
the tazkira identity cards of individuals; for the 
registry process, the information on 
the tazkira need on  (Bose, 2014). 
Instead, and following the April 5 poll, the IEC 
announced that it would hold the run-off 
not enough to solve the issue of the shortage in 
ballot papers. For the run-off, band aid 
contingencies were put in place to counter any 
logistical shortfalls: all polling centres were 
supplied with a surplus of 5% extra ballots with 
specific centres that experienced severe 
shortfalls issued an additional 5% (bringing the 
total to 10% extra ballots at these centres). 
Despite these measures, and as observed by 
other observer teams, several polling centres ran 
out of ballot papers. IEC staffers and candidate 
agents complained to observer teams (including 
mine) that the IEC failed to deliver additional 
ballots, keeping the centres waiting for several 
hours (Bose, 2014).  
The IEC decision to supply extra ballot papers is 
not the answer. Firstly, printing more ballot 
papers is a costly enterprise, particularly for an 
already struggling economy. Secondly, given the 
time-constraints and costs associated, how did 
the IEC determine how many more ballot papers 
to print and the distribution schema (without 
accurate voter-registry numbers, how does the 
Government and IEC determine which districts 
and centres get more)? Thirdly, and crucially, 
printing more papers contradicts the original 
intent of supplying polling stations with 600 
ballot papers each that of preventing potential 
fraud (Bose, 2014). The shortage in ballot papers 
has a root cause that will need to be addressed
perhaps in time for the 2015 Parliamentary and 
District Council elections. Let this, then, be a 
lesson to both the future government and its 
international partners: voter registry is a must 
and cannot be delayed. 
Ballot shortages aside, the voting process itself 
proceeded fairly smoothly on both occasions (the 
June poll was much smoother, IEC officials having 
implemented some of the lessons learned). One 
sticking point following the April 5 poll was 
conspiratorial discussions pertaining to the long 
and snaking queues at polling stations. Candidate 
agents, members of the campaigns, and even 
media persons/analysts queried whether IEC 
-
efforts designed to deny citizens their 
right to cast votes. At several polling stations, 
voting proceeded smoothly although my team 
members were struck that some of the electoral 
workers were moving at a much more laboured 
pace than others. There was nothing, however, to 
-
discrepancies are the consequence of a fledgling 
electoral process, coupled with the added 
logistical burden of conducting twin provincial 
and presidential elections. For the June 14 poll, 
the lack of a cumbersome provincial and 
presidential ballot ensured voter queues moved 
along quickly; the voting process could not be 
any simpler since voters had to choose between 
just two presidential candidates. This explains 
why several polling stations boasted of high 
voter counts by 10-11 a.m.; such was the ease 
with which the process progressed. 
 
Instrumentalities 
The 2014 Presidential run-off election has been 
committed by various actors entrusted with the 
governance of the country (see for example The 
Economist, 2014; Rosenberg and Ahmad, 2014). 
as it denotes that elections institutions (and 
officials) are completely suborned to political 
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take place? It occurs when the dynamics of the 
polity are such that: (a) a technically correct 
election may not lead to a politically desirable 
outcome, and in such instance, the suspected 
outcome determines the mechanics of the 
process; and (b) both voters and electoral 
officers/staffers can be held hostage to the 
desires of the powerful. In such instance, 
elections are but a step away from ethnicisation, 
which is exactly what happened in the run-off 
and its aftermath.  
Given the stakes involved in these elections, 
fraud was obviously the biggest concern. On the 
very day of the presidential run-off, the IEC 
Secretary-General, the Kabul Police Chief, 
General Zahir, of trying to commit fraud, accused 
Zia-ul-Haq Amarkhail. Allegedly, Amarkhail was 
caught red-handed trying to smuggle ballots out 
of the IEC headquarters with his son and two 
bodyguards. Whatever the outcome of pursuant 
investigations, the IEC will have to contend with 
further trust and legitimacy deficits.  
There are also concerns with the IEC 
projections. Several observers and analysts opine 
the turnout was not as high as the IEC are 
inclined to suggest, and place the turnout figure 
at a more modest figure. Numbers speak 
volumes, and the evidence raises questions: for 
instance, Ashraf Ghani is rumoured to have 
received 1.2 million votes from the three 
stronghold provinces of Khost, Paktia, and 
Paktika where the total number of registered 
voters are less than this number. This suggests 
100% or more of registered voters including 
women voted (Stancati et al., 2014). The total 
number of votes from these provinces was 1/3 of 
the estimated 1.2 million in the April 5 elections. 
It should be noted, however, that not all voters 
are registered and different identity cards are 
admissible. Therefore, a better and more reliable 
indicator for fraud is the number of ballot papers 
cast that exceed the number of ballot papers 
allocated per centre: Khost, Ghazni, and Paktia all 
indicate numbers in excess of 600/station. 
Typically, 100% utilisation of ballots or 600+ 
votes (i.e. exceptionally high turn-out in excess 
of ballots issued), and multiple whole number 
 
fraudulent activity. Immediately after the June 14 
poll, and whilst still in Kabul, I was receiving 
reports from fellow observer colleagues of ballot 
stuffing. Local and international observers were 
reporting that ballot boxes from far-flung polling 
centres arrived at the IEC headquarters in Kabul, 
neatly stacked. That is, the individual ballots 
were not scattered in the tamper-proof sealed 
ballot boxes, but were neatly stacked one above 
another in columns, sometimes held together by 
elastic bands! 
Ballot stuffing (for which Afghanistan is 
notorious), however, is not the only type of fraud 
that is of concern; manipulative activities erode 
trust in the electoral process and the institutions 
involved. Observer reports from around the 
country highlight subtle fraudulent behaviour, 
including candidate agents and IEC staffers 
urging voters to vote for particular candidates. 
Moreover, there appears to be no systematic 
process by which to distinguish between valid 
permissible, IEC staffers and candidate agents 
seemed unaware of this instruction (there were 
no visible instructions at polling stations we 
visited); instead, finger prints and signatures 
were being permitted, and that too often in 
favour of one candidate to the detriment of the 
other. The IEC instruction itself contradicts 
international electoral best practices: as long as 
the intention of the voter is clear indicated by 
ticks, signatures (even outside the designated 
zone, as long as they do not interfere with other 
candidates) ballots cast should be considered 
valid. The question then is, does the IEC 
implement international best practices 
 
How, then, does the IEC prevent electoral 
manipulation at polling centres? An atmosphere 
riddled with inconsistencies such as staff 
invalidating perfectly legitimate votes not only 
embarrasses the IEC, but also adds to the 
suspicion of fraud. Repetitions of such 
shortcomings will skew vote counts enough to 
level accusations of fraud against the overseeing 
institution, adding to the chaos. Hence, better 
training of IEC staff (and candidate agents) is a 
must. More importantly, perhaps, the IEC needs 
to improve its image, reputation, and legitimacy 
to be able to withstand both small and large-
scale discrepancies. 
The professionalism of IEC staffers, here, is 
critical to both perceptions of the IEC and to the 
proper and efficient conduct of an election. For 
evident. On April 5, my team was struck by the 
professionalism of local IEC staff. On that polling 
day, we encountered several individuals who had 
been IEC workers or managers in previous 
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elections, and thus had accrued the necessary 
skills and experience to manage a successful 
process. I recall, for instance, my team arrived at 
a polling centre in Kart-e Parwan district to 
observe vote counting. The counting was 
conducted very effectively by the polling centre 
manager who at all stages informed candidate 
agents of what he and his staff proposed to do 
and how they proposed to do it. After the 
numbers of the tamper-proof seals on the 
presidential ballot box were read aloud for the 
candidate agents, the seals were cut, the box was 
opened and the ballot papers then held aloft one 
by one by staff so that the agents could see that 
each paper had been appropriately stamped by 
the IEC official who issued it. At this point, the 
manager held up each ballot paper, announced 
for whom it had been cast, and handed it to staff 
to put it in an appropriate pile for that candidate 
on a wide table that had been built out of 
cardboard boxes (Bose, 2014). Clearly, the 
extensive training program under the aegis of the 
IEC and international community proved critical 
to the polling success. 
On June 14, however, my team witnessed 
voting behaviour, blatantly (the manipulative 
activities I refer to earlier). In future, the IEC and 
internationals will need to impress upon their 
staff the responsibility and value of neutrality
people do not appreciate attempts by staffers (or 
candidate agents) to influence their vote. I would, 
therefore, strongly recommend the United 
Nations Development Programme, Afghan 
government, and IEC to consider implementing a 
process whereby outstanding Afghan electoral 
staff can be identified and rewarded this is 
critical to ensuring competent staff are retained, 
allowing for institutional learning and 
development. Staffers also require more 
thorough training so as to minimise 
inconsistencies in management and conduct. 
More often than not, IEC staffers are unaware of 
the role of international observers, leading to 
suspicion and tension. 
 
Security 
While the international media Huffington Post 
(Donati and Shalizi, 2014) and The New York 
Times (Nordland and Zahori. 2014)  focused on 
the insurgent attacks that took place (the March 
20, 2014 Serena Hotel attack, the April 2, 2014 
attack at the Interior Ministry) in the lead-up to 
the elections, there was little mention of the 
scores that the ANSF foiled. The National 
Directorate of Security reported that the ANSF, 
including Special Forces, were responsible for 
foiling hundreds of attempted attacks: 140 in the 
single week prior to the April 5 poll (and an 
approximate total of 600 in the immediate weeks 
prior), and over 450 in the weeks leading up to 
the June 14 poll. These numbers tell a story; a 
story not only of the resolve of the Afghan 
government to dispel the Taliban threats, but 
also one of the ANSF coming of age. Without 
doubt, the massive turn-out on that first polling 
day was largely possible because of this success. 
Private conversations with ANSF personnel 
revealed around-the-clock work towards 
achieving a secure environment for polling.  
successes compared to the 600 odd attacks prior 
to the April 5 poll, June witnessed only 150 
attacks; this signifies a drop of almost 70% and 
heralds the professionalism and success of the 
security forces 
remove top security officials who had been 
celebrated for their work on the eve of the 
second round of elections came as a surprise 
(Graham-Harrison, 2014). Not only were the 
officials fired, charges illegal detentions and 
desecration of mosques were brought against 
the men who were to be tried in court. Whatever 
the motive behind the removal and charges, it 
counter future insurgent threats. 
Unlike on previous occasions, security for the 
2014 elections was the sole responsibility of the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The 
Afghan Ministry of Interior in close co-operation 
and co-ordination with the IEC and the National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) was in charge of the 
security arrangements. During the first round, 
large numbers of ANSF (army and police) and 
NDS personnel were required to be on duty for 
approximately 24 hours from April 5 through 
closing of polls and ballot counting on April 5. 
The security provision relied on an established 
rings of security responsibility, whereby a one 
kilometre radius of the polling centre was 
secured by army personnel supervised by the 
NDS; polling centre perimeter by police 
personnel supervised by the NDS; and the polling 
centres were manned by the police and NDS 
personnel. The electoral security plan was 
modified for the second round and on 14 June the 
one-kilometre radius was contracted to the 
Al Election Observer’s View & Appraisal of 2014 Afghan Election                                                        Srinjoy Bose 
 
                                                                                      www.ieeca.org/journal                                                                             9 
immediate vicinity of the polling centres. 
 
CONCLUSION: LASTING IMPRESSIONS 
April 5, 2014 may prove in hindsight to be a 
relatively peaceful polling day (the Interior 
Ministry confirmed a number of attacks along the 
eastern border) and the almost 60% voter turn-
out are not just damning denunciations of the 
Taliban insurgency (depriving it of moral and 
political legitimacy), but a major victory for the 
electoral process itself. In spite of cold, wet, and 
muddy conditions, voters in Kabul were 
generally committed to and enthusiastic about 
the process. Though they waited patiently and 
quietly for the most part, they were assertive 
about exercising their rights. Throughout the day, 
at every centre and station, there was a readiness 
to joke and engage in banter which, given the 
security concerns and precautions, was 
surprising. While not without discrepancies 
(polling stations running out of ballot papers a 
consequence of the lack of a voter-registration 
process and centres reportedly closing at 1:30 
p.m.), the election was a success for electoral 
competition, a necessary criterion for successful 
democratic transition. 
Second, the overall voter turnout in Kabul on 
June 14 was considerably lower than on April 5. 
While the absence of long queues at polling 
centres as observed by most international teams 
across the city is not in itself evidence of this 
claim, an examination of voter log-sheets will 
attest this. There were, however, several centres 
in Pashtun neighbourhoods where polling 
stations exceeded their allocated ballot sheets. 
This indicates Pashtuns came out in large 
numbers to vote for Dr Ghani (presumably), 
while Tajik and Hazara neighbourhoods recorded 
lower votes cast (indeed, several observers are 
claiming Dr Abdullah failed to mobilise new
individuals and communities who had not voted 
in the first round of elections, or had voted for 
other candidates Hazara voters, for instance). 
Third, although the electoral process has come 
a long way since 2009, logistical shortcomings 
persist. While some issues experienced during 
the April 5 elections were addressed somewhat
for instance, the ballot paper contingencies on 
polling days, the IEC, Home Ministry and Police 
will need to coordinate their operations better so 
as to ensure delivery of resources as and when 
required. Failure to deliver ballot papers to 
polling centres results in accusations of electoral 
manipulation levelled against the IEC and 
government. Perhaps more importantly, 
discrepancies between result sheet tallies and 
official IEC tallies need to be addressed. 
Following the April 5 elections, there were 
numerous reported cases of discrepancies 
between result sheets posted outside polling 
centres and the IEC tally. This resulted in loss of 
legitimacy for the IEC because the Electoral 
Complaints Commission basically accused the 
former of fraud. Measures need to be put in place 
to avoid such repetitions. 
Fourth, on both occasions, the post-election 
campaign narratives (accusations of fraud and 
estimates of votes won) were in full-swing 
immediately following poll-closure despite calls 
from the IEC and government to desist from such 
behaviour indicating a premeditated strategy. 
During the April 5 elections, the leading 
candidates were blaming each other of 
fraudulent activity. Following the June 14 
elections, candidates targeted the IEC, accusing it 
of fraud. Specifically, Dr Abdullah seemed to be 
blaming the IEC (and President Karzai) while Dr 
Ghani appeared to be accusing the government 
machinery, i.e. the Tajik-dominated police and 
armed forces. For millions of Afghans the 
elections were a source of hope. It is imperative 
for this reason that the candidates ensure the 
above politics and assisting the various 
institutional mechanisms in their mutual 
struggle to achieve a strong and healthy 
democracy. 
Finally, the 2014 elections fiasco which had 
very nearly brought Afghanistan to the brink of 
civil crisis (if not civil war) and political 
standstill teaches us that premature localisation 
and indigenisation of the elections process in 
Afghanistan (or elsewhere) is a bad idea. In this 
sense, the international community has been 
very naïve: for the UN, the short-term impact of 
elections was more critical than solving the 
entrenched problems (voter registration, etc.); 
this is buttressed by the change in the 
hetoric/narrative 
 
With respect to the specific conduct of future 
elections, there are two potential solutions worth 
mentioning. Some electoral experts are of the 
opinion that the entire process of elections 
should be sub-contracted to the UN. Obviously 
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there is a question of who will foot the bill, but it 
is either that or a repeat of 2014 and having to 
spend US$147 million dollars on a fraught 
recount process (compare this figure to the 
internationally administered 2004 Presidential 
election - US$90 million). It is, however, difficult 
to see the Afghan government accepting such a 
solution. The alternative and perhaps a more 
reasonable one at that is to have international 
electoral experts embedded in both the IEC and 
EEC Secretariats, but in larger numbers than 
previously. This will provide both the necessary 
expertise for problem-solving and go a long way 
towards ensuring the independence of the said 
institutions. International political and 
diplomatic pressure on the Afghan government 
to accept this solution will be critical. 
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